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Burke and Maxwell: Domestic Law

DOMESTIC LAW
I.

VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS
HELD To BE MARITAL PROPERTY

The South Carolina Court of Appeals has held that military retirement
benefits accrued during marriage are subject to equitable apportionment in
divorce proceedings and settlements.' However, in a 1991 attempt to
effectuate and expedite the downsizing of the United States' standing military
membership, Congress enacted the Special Separation Benefits Programs
(SSB) 2 and Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) program3 providing
voluntary separation benefits to service members not eligible for full military
retirement benefits. In 1995 the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Fisher v.
Fisher' held that discharge under the VSI program is analogous to early
retirement, and as such the benefits received therefrom are marital property
subject to equitable apportionment. 5
The Fishers were married in 1979 and separated in 1989, at which time
the husband commenced an action for separate maintenance. 6 The family court
issued a final order in 1990 approving the parties' settlement agreement which
included a provision that the wife would receive twenty percent of the
husband's military retirement benefits, payable in monthly allotments upon
actual entitlement.' The husband received a voluntary honorable discharge
from the Navy in 1993 after sixteen years of service. Because he had not
completed the mandatory twenty year enlistment period, the husband was not
eligible for full military retirement. 8
The husband testified that, in order to satisfy the twenty year requirement,
he would have had to re-enlist at least twice more for two-year terms, and
such re-enlistment requires the recommendation of a commanding officer.
During one such enlistment period, however, the husband extensively damaged
his commanding officer's vehicle and was subsequently admitted to the
psychiatric ward of a Navy hospital for treatment.9 Placing the husband at risk
of involuntary discharge and making re-enlistment a practical impossibility, the
incident prompted the husband to accept discharge under the VSI program,

1. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 309 S.C. 225, 420 S.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. See 10 U.S.C. § 1174a (1994).
3. See 10 U.S.C. § 1175 (1994).
4. __ S.C. _, 462 S.E.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1995).
5. Id. at
6. Id. at
7. Id. at

8. Id. at
9. Id. at

,
,
,

462 S.E.2d at 305.
462 S.E.2d at 304.
462 S.E.2d at 304.

462 S.E.2d at 304.
462 S.E.2d at 304.
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which would provide him with annual payments of $10,114.50 for thirty-two
0
years. 1
In 1993 the wife commenced an action for divorce wherein she requested
the court adopt the previous consent order." The wife alleged that the
husband's discharge and subsequent annuity from the Navy under the VSI
program was in lieu of retirement benefits as contemplated in the 1990 order,
and she requested payments from the husband's VSI disbursements pursuant
to the 1990 order. 2 The husband answered and counterclaimed that the
wife's request for twenty percent of the VSI annuity was barred by res judicata
and that the VSI payments were not subject to state equitable distribution laws
because of federal pre-emption. The family court granted the wife's divorce
request and ordered the husband to pay twenty percent of his annual VSI
payment to the wife in accordance with their prior agreement; the husband
appealed. '1
The court of appeals began by considering the husband's claim that the
family court had erroneously found the VSI payments to be marital property;
he asserted that the VSI annuity was non-marital property because his
discharge from the Navy pursuant to the VSI program occurred after judicial
approval of the parties' separation agreement, which provided for apportionment of his "retirement" benefits exclusively.' 4 The court disagreed, finding
the VSI payments analogous to retirement benefits, long held to be marital
property.'" The court then affirmed the family court's finding that the VSI
16
payments constituted marital property.
The paramount consideration in the court's reasoning was the classification of the VSI payments. Review of the limited authority revealed a schism:
courts encountering the issue in Ohio and Florida had held the VSI payments
more closely resembled severance pay than retirement benefits so that VSI
payments did not constitute marital property."' Courts in Arizona, Montana,
and one Florida District Court of Appeals had held VSI and SSB payments
tantamount to retirement benefits subject to equitable division.' 8 The Fisher
court held the VSI program analogous to an early retirement. Primarily, the

10. Id. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 304.
11. Id. at
462 S.E.2d at 304.
12. Id. at
462 S.E.2d at 304-05.
13. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 305.
14. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 305.
15. Id. at_, 462 S.E.2d at 305 (citing Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 309 S.C. 225, 420 S.E.2d 875
(Ct. App. 1992)).
16. Id. at _,
462 S.E.2d at 305.
17. See Kelson v. Kelson, 647 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); McClure v. McClure,
647 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
18. See In re Marriage of Crawford, 884 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Abernethy v.
Fishkin, 638 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Blair v. Blair, 894 P.2d 958 (Mont. 1995).
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court relied on the fact that the VSI payments, like retirement benefits, were
calculated and based in part on the member's length of service and pay grade
during service.' 9 The court also seemed to attribute some weight to the
husband's own misconduct being the reason full military retirement benefits
were not available.2"
The husband raised three arguments in opposition to the finding that VSI
payments are treated as retirement benefits subject to equitable division: (1)
property acquired by either party after entry of a permanent order of separate
maintenance and support, or of a permanent order approving a property or
marital settlement, is non-marital;2 1 (2) the family court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to modify the original property division made pursuant to the 1990
final order; and (3) federal pre-emption bars the application of state equitable
distribution laws to VSI payments.' The court rejected all three contentions.
Although the majority conceded that the husband had cited section 20-7473 for the correct proposition, it rejected the husband's first argument
because: "[A]ny rights the husband now possesses to receive early discharge
incentive payments are due to the time he spent in the military and accrued
during his marriage to the wife, not after the separation agreement was
approved."' Rejecting the lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument, the
court found that it was the husband's voluntary election of early discharge
payments instead of the full retirement benefits envisioned in the final consent
order that enabled the family court to direct monies to the wife in accordance
with, and to give effect to, the 1990 order.24 The court refused to allow the
husband to divest the wife of her rights as determined in the 1990 order as a
result of his own voluntary alteration of the method of receipt of his postmilitary service benefits. 5 This line of reasoning comports with findings
from other jurisdictions that have rejected the lack of subject matter jurisdiction contention, stating instead that the trial courts were, in substance, merely
enforcing the prior agreement and not modifying it.26

19. Fisher,__ S.C. at_,462 S.E.2d at 305. The formula for calculation of VSI payments
can be found at 10 U.S.C. § 1175(e)(1) (1994).
20. Fisher, __ S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 305.
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473(2)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
22. Fisher, __ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 305-06.
23. Id. at __,462 S.E.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 305.
25. Id. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 305.
26. See Abernethy v. Fishkin, 638 So. 2d 160, 161 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Blair v.
Blair, 894 P.2d 958, 963 (Mont. 1995); cf. Kelson v. Kelson, 647 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
modify the parties' property settlement order absent fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching).
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In rejecting the husband's federal pre-emption argument, the court seized
upon the fact that Congress had failed to manifest the requisite pre-emptive
intent by specifically excluding early discharge incentive payments from state
equitable division laws by statute, as it had done explicitly before.27 "[Hliad
Congress intended to exclude early separation incentive pay from state
apportionment laws," the court reasoned, "it easily could have done so."28
Further, the court noted as evidence of Congressional intent that, in enacting
the VSI and SSB programs, the Department of Defense disseminated literature
to explain the programs. The literature stated that the treatment of VSI and
SSB payments was not dictated by federal law and that the state courts would
be able to rule on the divisibility of the new incentives.29 Although the
court's pre-emption analysis is in accord with that of other jurisdictions,
shallow is the depth of its reasoning. Both In re Marriageof Crawford,30 the
first case to address the VSI/SSB issue, and Blair v. Blair3 give comprehensive, yet concise, background information and analysis on the history of the
pre-emption argument.32 As a result, their similar conclusions appear far
more developed and judicious than those in Fisher.
Perhaps the most curious omission from the majority's analysis in Fisher
is any meaningful attempt to interpret or give effect to the actual rights created
and contemplated by the parties in the 1990 final order. The majority
indirectly addresses this issue only to the extent that it finds the VSI payment
analogous to the "retirement benefits" apportioned in the order, that any
"rights" the husband now has to the VSI payments accrued during the
marriage, and that the "rights" of the wife contemplated in the order cannot
be divested via the husband's voluntary actions.33 But what was the nature of

27. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (holding veteran's disability benefits
received in lieu of waived retirement benefits could not be treated as divisible property when
disability pay was expressly exempted from claims pursuant to Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1994)).
28. Fisher, __ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 306.
29. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 306 (citing Abernethy, 638 So. 2d at 162).
30. 884 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
31. 894 P.2d 958 (Mont. 1995).
32. Crawford, 884 P.2d at 212; Blair, 894 P.2d at 960-61. Exemplifying the historical
treatment set forth in Crawford and Blair are the Supreme Court's decisions in McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (holding that equitable division of military retirement benefits is
a question for Congress alone, and in response Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994), giving states express authority to
divide disposable military retirement or retainer benefits), and Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581
(1989) (holding that state courts were expressly pre-empted from division of the portion of
military retirement pay waived in order to receive Veteran's Administration disability benefits
under the USFSPA.)
33. Fisher, __ S.C. at _,
462 S.E.2d at 305.
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the "rights" created and contemplated by the 1990 order, when the VSI
program did not exist? The majority does not engage this issue.
According to the dissenting opinion of Judge Goolsby, the only "right"
of the wife created and contemplated by the 1990 final order was a mere
contingency interest in non-matured retirement benefits, to be paid "upon [the
husband's] actual entitlement to said retirement benefits." 34 Because the
separation agreement between the parties was drafted seven years prior to the
husband's eligibility for full military retirement benefits, the parties understood
that such contingencies as involuntary discharge or, certainly, death would
prevent the retirement benefits from maturing and extinguish any interest of
the wife. Judge Goolsby's reliance on Kelson v. Kelson35 is particularly
apposite because Kelson is nearly identical factually to Fisher. In Kelson the
court held that the husband's VSI payments were not the "retirement benefits"
contemplated by the specific terms of the settlement agreement;36 however,
like Fisher, in Kelson the VSI program became effective after the date of the
settlement agreement. The Kelson court stated: "The. . . agreement does not
indicate any intent by the parties to provide for any contingencies other than
division of vested and matured retired pay upon the event of Major Kelson
obtaining the right to such payments."' The settlement agreement and facts
of Fisher lend themselves to a similar conclusion. Finally, the majority's
neglect of the settlement language is underscored by its approbation of
Abernethy, in which the Florida court's finding that VSI payments could be
equitably distributed was supported by the husband's specific agreement in the
property settlement.3"
In continued harmony with Kelson, the Fisher dissent concluded that the
VSI payments were not actually retirement benefits, but severance pay.39 As

such, the dissent would uphold the husband's preferred application of section
20-7-473, resulting in the VSI payment's classification as non-marital property,
thereby removing the family court's jurisdiction to equitably apportion the VSI
annuity.40 The dissent declined to reach the issue of whether VSI payments
are subject to equitable division via a specific settlement provision but noted

34. Id. at_ n.1, 462 S.E.2d at 307-08 n.1 (Goolsby, J., dissenting) (quoting the provision
of the 1990 final order).
35. 647 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
36. Id. at 960-61.
37. Id. at 960.
38. Abemethy v. Fishkin, 638 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
39. Fisher,__ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 307 (Goolsby, J., dissenting). The dissent cites
10 U.S.C. § 1175(h)(1), (4) (1994), providing different sources for VSI and retirement benefits
in substantiation of its distinction. Several other arguments are posited in Kelson to establish VSI
payments as severance pay. 647 So. 2d at 961-62.
40. Fisher,__ S.C. at_, 462 S.E.2d at 307 (Goolsby, J., dissenting); cf. Kelson, 647 So.
2d at 961-62; McClure v. McClure, 647 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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that the "federal statutory mandate that '[t]he member's right to [VSI]
payments shall not be transferable.' "4' The internal logic of the dissent, and
of Kelson by reference, is persuasive at least in its focus on the import of the
actual terms and effect of the settlement agreement, as well as the nature of
the rights it created.
In holding that VSI payments are marital property subject to equitable
distribution, the South Carolina Court of Appeals provided important security
to the spouses and families of military personnel. Such voluntary separation
incentives and benefits now cannot be secreted away or used to circumvent an
equitable apportionment of anticipated military retirement. The public policy
advantages of this decision are manifest, but will the court turn a deaf ear in
the future to challenges based upon the property rights bargained for and
secured in marital property settlements? Further, the court's limitation of its
holding in Fisher to the facts of the case should reveal the role and extent of
the husband's misconduct on the court's decision.4" The abundance of
ambiguous references to the nature of VSI/SSB payments in statutes,
legislative history, and case law provides ample fodder to test the holding of
Fisher with different facts, and perhaps a different bench.
Richard C. Burke

41. Fisher, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 308 (Goolsby, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1175(f) (1994)).
42. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 305.
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COURT EXTENDS PRIMARY CARETAKER DOCTRINE TO
CASES IN WHICH NEITHER PARENT TAKES
CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PARENTAL DUTIES

In Panisv. Parris'a mother, Ruth Parris, asked the trial court to review
a family court order awarding custody of her son to the child's father, Donald
Parris. Mrs. Parris alleged that the order was based on gender bias.2 The trial
court found no trace of gender bias in the custody determination. Likewise, the
South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the award of child
custody to the father. In the supreme court's opinion, the custody order
represented the best interests of the child in view of evidence that the father
was more actively involved than the mother in the child's daily activities.
To properly analyze Mrs. Parris's allegation of gender bias, a close
examination of the facts is necessary. Also relevant is the way the court
applied the law in this case. That is, the following analysis will focus on what
law the court could have applied, but may have overlooked in determining
custody. Additionally, the analysis will compare the way the law was applied
to Mrs. Parris with the application of child custody law in prior cases
determined by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In Panisthe supreme court based its ruling primarily on the trial court's
finding that Mr. Parris was more actively involved in the son's daily life than
was Mrs. Parris. 3 In so holding, the court may have improperly applied the
primary caretaker presumption. The Panis decision grants favored status to
a parent who merely performs more of the parental caretaking duties. More
reasoned precedent suggests, however, that this presumption should only be
applied when one parent has "clearly" taken responsibility for the child.4 By
basing custody on evidence that the father was more actively involved in the
child's daily life, both the trial court and the supreme court may have
overlooked other relevant factors in determining custody.
Ruth and Donald Parris were married in February 1979.' Ruth gave birth
to their only son, Maxfield, in December 19806 and took a one-year leave of
absence from work to care for the child.7 While Donald worked on various

1. _ S.C. __, 460 S.E.2d 571 (1995).
2. Id. at
460 S.E.2d at 572.
3. Id. at
460 S.E.2d at 572.
4. See Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (W.Va. 1993); Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S.,
435 S.E.2d 6 (V. Va. 1993); Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993); Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
5. Parris, __ S.C. at __, 460 S.E.2d at 571.
6. Id.
7. Record at 35.
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real estate projects and commercial ventures,' Ruth maintained employment
as a real estate sales agent throughout the marriage and until the date of
appeal. 9 Although Ruth became one of the most successful realtors in Hilton
Head,"0 she kept a flexible work schedule, allowing her to take her son to
school and to doctors' appointments and to spend time with him." After
Maxfield was born, Donald and Ruth employed a full-time housekeeper, Doris
Luden, to clean, cook, sew, do laundry, and perform basic caretaking
responsibilities for Maxfield. 2 In 1990, primarily due to financial concerns,
Ruth informed Donald that she wanted a divorce. 3 Donald subsequently
moved out of the marital home, and he himself filed for divorce-leaving Ruth
to care for Maxfield. 4 Ultimately, both Donald and Ruth sought sole custody
of Maxfield.' 5 The family court judge awarded Ruth temporary custody but
noted its temporary award would have no precedential value.' 6
The family court's final order on December 30, 1991 granted permanent
custody to Donald based on the determination that he "exhibited a more active
role in the day to day activities of the child."" The initial notation by the
judge that Donald assumed substantial parental responsibilities was based on
the testimony of witnesses. These witnesses testified that Donald made
breakfast in the mornings,"8 read to Maxfield and tucked him in at night,'
attended every parent-teacher conference,20 volunteered to join Maxfield in
extra-curricular activities, 21 and transported Maxfield to and from swim
meets.' Parental duties were also performed by Ruth and Doris Luden, the
housekeeper. The record reveals that Ruth shopped for the child's clothes,'
drove car pool,24 assured that Maxfield was ready for school,2- went on
bike rides,26 and arranged for certain after-school activities, including martial

8. Id. at 109-12.
9. Id. at 34-35.
10. Parris, __ S.C. at
, 460 S.E.2d at 571.
11. Record at 347-48.
12. Id. at 36, 118.
13. Parris,__ S.C. at
, 460 S.E.2d at 571.
14. Id. at _,460 S.E.2d at 571.
15. Id. at __,460 S.E.2d at 571.
16. Id. at_ & n.1, 460 S.E.2d at 571 & n.1.
17. Id. at _,
460 S.E.2d at 571-72.
18. Record at 35.
19. Id. at 295.
20. Id. at 135.
21. Id. at 297.
22. Id. at 136.
23. Id. at 342, 346.
24. Id. at 151, 346.
25. Id. at 348.
26. Id. at 347.
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arts lessons.27 Although Ruth attended some parent-teacher conferences, she
did not participate daily in her son's after-school activities." Significantly,
the transcript reveals that Ms. Luden performed the largest portion of the
caretaking responsibilities. 29
These facts illustrate that both parents performed caretaking duties; yet,
the court found Donald to be the primary caretaker. Again, the question arises
as to what other relevant factors should have been considered.
A well reasoned line of West Virginia cases suggests that the primary
caretaker presumption is only to be applied if one parent has "clearly" taken
responsibility for the bulk of childcare duties.30 When neither parent has so
clearly assumed the parental role, the court is to rely on other factors,
including the competence of each parent, the resources of each parent, the
opinions of third parties, and the age, health, and sex of the child. 3 The
supreme court in Parris stated that one parent's larger contribution to the
child's daily life is a "relevant consideration," 32 and expressly denied it was
the sole factor to be considered. The court, however, failed to discuss the
weighting or even existence of other factors relevant to the child's best
interests.
Though the South Carolina General Assembly has not provided explicit
guidelines for determining the best interest of the child in custody awards,33
as a general rule South Carolina courts focus primarily on three factors:
(1) who has been the primary caretaker; (2) the conduct, attributes, and
resources of the parents; and (3) the opinions of third parties--including
guardians ad litem, expert witnesses, and the child. 34 Both the lower court
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.at 461.
Id.at 151.
Id.at 118.
See cases cited supra note 4.

31. See cases cited supra note 4;
(1993).

RoY T. STUCKEY & F. GLENN SMITH, MARITAL LITIGATION

IN SOUTH CAROLINA 327

32. Parris, - S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 573.
33. In contrast, other state statutes do provide specific criteria for determining the best
interests of the child. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West Supp. 1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5) (West 1993). The
Michigan statute defines the best interests of the child to mean the sum of all factors including:
(a) the emotional ties between the parties and the child; (b) the capacity of parties involved to
give the child love and guidance and to continue to educate and raise the child in his or her
religion or creed, if any; (c) the capacity of the parties to provide the child with necessities, (d)
the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment; (e) the permanence,
the moral fitness of the parties; (g) the mental
as a family unit, of potential custodial homes; (f)
and physical health of the parties, (h) the home, school, and community record of the child; (i)
the reasonable preference of the child, if of sufficient age; (j)the willingness and ability of each
party to facilitate a close relationship between child and the other parent; (k) domestic violence,
and (1)any other factor considered by the court to be relevant. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.23 (West Supp. 1996).
34. STUCKEY & SMITH, supra note 31, at 327. Other factors that courts consider include "the
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and the supreme court, however, appeared to rest their custody decisions
primarily on one of these three factors-the father's caretaking duties. The
courts made very little mention of the conduct, attributes, and resources of the
parents. And though the supreme court did quote the opinions of third parties,
each third party acknowledged that both parents were fit.35
Though the term "primary caretaker" is clearly defined in some states,36
neither South Carolina's case law nor its statutes provide specific guidelines
for determining which parent is the primary caretaker.3" Rather, South
Carolina courts have simplistically identified the primary caretaker as the
parent who a court determines has assumed the more significant portion of
caregiving responsibilities. 38 The factual settings of the individual cases do,
however, evidence a logical standard. For example, in West v. West3 9 the
court found the father to be the primary caretaker because he "bathed the
children on a regular basis, put them to bed, fixed meals, took them to school,
assisted with homework, and attended church with the children."40
Again, South Carolina courts typically place significant emphasis on the
conduct, attributes, and resources of the parents. Factors such as "financial
and physical resources, free time to spend with the children, access to friends
and relatives, the availability of child care, tenderness, caring, and religious
training" are important in this evaluation. 4 ' In fact, the existence of an
extended family support network has proven determinative in at least one prior
South Carolina custody decision.42 In Parris,although Donald had more free
time during the day to spend with Maxfield, Ruth's career success allowed her

age, health, and sex of [a child] . . .the residence, surroundings, and opportunities afforded in
the respective [parental] environments; the conduct and suitability of parents; the preference in
favor of the innocent or prevailing [divorce contestant] ... ; the financial condition of the
parents; agreements between the parties, and others." Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 352, 130
S.E.2d 916, 921 (1963).
35. Parris, __ S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 572.
36. For example, in West Virginia the primary caretaker is the parent who: (1) prepares the
meals; (2) bathes and dresses the child; (3) provides medical care; (4) arranges babysitting and
after-school activities; (5) puts the child to bed and wakes the child up in the morning;
(6) disciplines the child; and (7) teaches the child to read and write.
37. Cf. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 ('. Va. 1981).
38. See, e.g., Epperly v. Epperly, 312 S.C. 411,415, 440 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1994) (reversing
a custody award to father and naming mother primary caretaker because she was the parent who
had cared for the children throughout their lives); Smith v. Smith, 294 S.C. 194, 197, 363
S.E.2d 404, 406 (Ct. App. 1987) (naming a mother as primary caretaker because she had
assumed most of the parental responsibilities for the children all their lives and the children had
lived with her since separation).
39. 294 S.C. 190, 363 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1987).
40. Id. at 193, 363 S.E.2d at 403.
41. STUCKEY & SMITH, supra note 31, at 333.
42. See Wheeler v. Gill, 307 S.C. 94, 413 S.E.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1992).
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to provide more significant financial resources than Donald could.43 Also,
during the twenty months in which Ruth had temporary custody, she provided
Maxfield with regular access to and encouraged nurturing relationships with
relatives and peers." The paternal grandparents testified as to their regular,
almost daily, association with Maxfield and described their relationship with
Maxfield as close and loving. 45
The child's adjustment to the home, school, and community, and how the
child's best interests are being furthered in the current custodial arrangement
are also relevant factors to be considered in a custody determination.4 6 South
Carolina follows the presumption that maintaining a current custodial setting
is preferable to removal of the child.47 During the twenty months in which
Ruth retained temporary custody of Maxfield, he attended the same school and
synagogue. Even though Maxfield proved to be thriving during the time he
was in custody of the mother," and no evidence indicated that placement was
inappropriate, the court did not mention stability and continuity as relevant
factors.
The court in Parris also seems to have overlooked a statute that
recognizes religion as a factor to be considered in evaluating the competence
of the parents, preferring the parent espousing the same religious faith as the
child.4 9 Ruth is Jewish, and Donald is Methodist.50 Maxfield regularly
attended Jewish Sunday School. 5' While it is arguable that children of tender
years are not capable of deciding their own religious preference, surely an
eleven-year-old, like Maxfield, would have some predisposition.
The last of the three factors South Carolina courts most commonly cite in
custody decisions is the opinion of third parties, including the testimony of
guardians ad litem, expert witnesses, and the opinion of the child. 2 The

43. Parris,_ S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 571; Record at 34.
44. Brief of Appellant at 10; Record at 321-29.
45. Record at 321-23, 329.
46. See, e.g., McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 482-83, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1982)
(finding both parents to be fit, the judge determined removal of the child from familiar
surroundings would not benefit the child).
47. Id. at 483, 299 S.E.2d at 323. The custody dispute in McAlister involved a request for a
change in a permanent award, but in ParrisRuth had only a temporary custody award. The
policy reasons-furthering the child's stability by providing continuity of community activities
and relationships-however, remain the same in both cases.
48. Record at 38.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1520 (Law Co-op. 1985).
50. Record at 144.
51. Id. at 144.
52. STUCKEY & SMrrH, supra note 31, at 336. In addition, courts have considered the
testimony of social service agencies, hospital professionals, and family court officials. See, e.g.,
McSwain v. Holmes, 269 S.C. 293, 297, 237 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1977) (considering testimony for
the Department of Social Services); Exparte Roper, 254 S.C. 558, 561, 176 S.E.2d 175, 176
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court in Parrisdid look to the opinions of third parties. The guardian ad litem
and the court-appointed psychologist found both the mother and father to be
fit. 53 Though Maxfield's doctor testified that Donald would be better suited
to serve as the custodial parent because Donald instructed and encouraged the
child and was "in tune" with the child,54 the court-appointed psychologist felt
that both parents deserved custody and urged the court to allow the child
continued access to both. 55 The psychologist concluded that the elevenyear-old child was healthy, emotionally stable, "very intelligent, [and] very
mature in a lot of ways."" He also noted that the child preferred to live with
the mother during the school year and to spend time with the father in the
summer.5 In determining the amount of weight given to be given to a child's
spoken preference, courts first consider the child's age and maturity. 5
Perhaps the court should have more strongly considered Maxfield's preference,
especially in light of the court-appointed psychologist's evaluation of Maxfield
as very mature. The psychologist concluded, "I do not think that with a child
of this age that the child's wishes should always predominate, but this is a
pretty perceptive kind of child.""
The court's failure to mention these relevant factors and instead resting
the Parris's custody determination primarily on the childcare responsibilities
of the father is a deviation from past decisions. Perhaps the Parriscourt meant
to modify South Carolina custody law to adopt a universal application of the
primary caretaker presumption even in the absence of a true primary caretaker.
It is the position of this author that such a modification would be detrimental
to the commonly stated goal of honoring the child's best interests.
Although Mrs. Parris's allegations of gender bias were summarily
dismissed and the case ultimately decided by an unusually dominant application
of the primary caretaker presumption, evidence suggests that some courts
have, in fact, treated mothers and fathers differently in determining custody

(1970) (considering testimony from the mental health center).
53. Parris, - S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 572.
54. Id. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 572.
55. Supp. Record at 36-37.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 18-19.
58. See Moorhead v. Scott, 259 S.C. 580, 193 S.E.2d 510 (1972) (holding that the wishes
of children ages 9, 11, and 12 were not determinative because the court determined it would be
far more beneficial for the children to live with their mother and her new husband). Yet, the
court did state, "It is clear that the wishes of a child of any age may be considered under all the
circumstances, but the weight given to those wishes must be dominated by what is best for the
welfare of the children." Id. at 585, 193 S.E.2d at 513. See also Guinan v. Guinan, 254 S.C.
554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970) (giving substantial weight to the wishes of a sixteen-year-old);
Poliakoff v. Poliakoff, 221 S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1952) (giving little significance to the
wishes of a six-year-old girl).
59. Supp. Record at 18.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/10

12

Burke and Maxwell: Domestic Law

1996]

DOMESTIC LAW

awards. For example, some judges have assessed the personal and parental
behavior of mothers and fathers according to different standards.' That is,
some courts have allegedly overvalued male contributions to caretaking
responsibilities while attributing minimal weight to those of the mother."
Such a tendency would come as no surprise when one considers common
societal expectations of mothers as caretakers and fathers as breadwinners.
Other courts have possibly scrutinized a mother's work schedule more
critically than a father's schedule.62 Still others have allegedly held women
to a higher moral standard.6' Finally, courts have allegedly criticized mothers
for relying on others for childcare and credited fathers for having such
caretakers available.' 4
American society has become aware of the injurious effects of sex
discrimination on working mothers in judicial custody determinations.' In
fact, the judiciary itself created independent task force commissions to uncover
discrimination in the judicial system,' and many judges acknowledge gender
bias in American courtrooms. 67 These state task force commissions have

60. Lynn H. Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181,

192 (1990).
61. Id. (citing MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS,
GENDER BIAS INTHE COURTS 29 (1989)); see Mary A. Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment,
29 J. FAM. L. 1, 25-26 (1990-91).
62. See, e.g. Richmond v. Tecklenberg, 302 S.C. 331, 336, 396 S.E.2d 111, 114 (Ct. App.
1990) (emphasizing that the mother, an obstetrician, "would make daily rounds at the hospital
and have to schedule time for surgery, be available for emergencies and deliver babies" and
failing to comment on the father's schedule, noting only that he was "in the oil business"); Nancy
D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 239 (1982).
63. Schafran, supra note 60, at 192 (citing REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT at 59, 62-66 (1989)).
64. Jennifer E. Home, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child
Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2134 (1993).
65. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination By Law: A Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 742 (1971).
66. See Schafran, supra note 60, at 181-86; REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, published in 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 803 (1990); THE FIRST
YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN INTHE COURTS
- JUNE 1984, published in 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129, 136 (1986) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY
REPORT]; Sol Wachtler, The Lady in the Harbor and the Lady in Albany-Two Symbols of
Freedom, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (1986-87).
67.
Stereotyped thinking about the nature and roles of the sexes, devaluation of
women and what is perceived as women's work, and myths and misconceptions about the social and economic realities of women's and men's lives are
as prevalent in the justice system as in the other institutions of society. In
the courts these three aspects of gender bias distort decision making and
create a courtroom environment that undermines women's credibility.
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found that women are often denied equal justice and face differing treatment
and opportunities than their male counterparts.68
The family court judge in Parris,by not mentioning all relevant factors
that may have been favorable to the mother in determining custody, may have
placed undue emphasis on Ruth's career as a successful, competitive working
woman. This emphasis on Ruth's career could have led the court to find that
Donald had more free time during the day than Ruth to spend with Maxfield. 6 9 Ruth maintained employment as a real estate agent throughout the
marriage, except for the one year after Maxfield was born when Ruth took
leave from work in order to spend time with and care for the child.7" She had
achieved much success and was described as one of the most successful
residential realtors on Hilton Head.7' Ruth's schedule was flexible and
allowed her to take Maxfield to and from school as well as spend additional
time with him,72 but neither the family court order nor the appellate court
opinion ever mentioned this fact. In contrast, Donald was involved in
numerous real estate projects throughout the marriage, never settling down to
build a successful career. 7 He served as an independent financial consultant
in the 1970's before he began his own development company. 74 He was
employed for a time by Marathon Oil Company,7" but in 1987 he again
pursued a private effort in real estate management and consulting, which
required him to work at the office on weekends. 76 The court stated that Don
Parris "was actively involved with the management of the family income and
finances, whereas Defendant concentrated on her career and aggressively
pursued income production. "7 The court noted that Ruth "enjoyed her job
and real estate career which she has pursued competitively and aggressively" 78 and further described her as a "woman, who in the past has not been

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE JUDGE'S

BOOK 66 (1989).
68. Schafran, supra note 60, at 187. For example, the New Jersey task force concluded the
following: "Although the law as written is for the most part gender neutral, stereotyped myths,
beliefs, and biases were found to sometimes affect judicial decision-making .... In addition,
there is strong evidence that women and men are sometimes treated differently in courtrooms,
in chambers, and at professional gatherings." NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 136.
69. Parris, - S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 572.
70. Record at 34-35, 113.
71. Parris, __ S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 571.
72. Record at 346-47.
73. Id. at 109-11.
74. Id. at 109.
75. Id. at 110-111.
76. Id. at 109-110, 347.
77. Id.at 34.
78. Id. at 36.
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particularly family oriented. " " Curiously, the court did not recognize the
family's need for Ruth to produce income in light of Donald's job instability.
Another suggestion of gender bias is that the family court order credited
Ruth with creating the need for the housekeeper while placing emphasis on
Donald's contributions to caretaking responsibilities. The final order states:
The evidence reflects that there have been problems during this twelve (12)
year marriage over conflicts between Defendant's [Ruth's] career goals and
objectives, and her marital situation. To accommodate the conflicts
between career, family and marriage the parties ...employed a full time
housekeeper, and Plaintiff has assumed many of the household responsibilities.8 °
Though the housekeeper was jointly employed by both parties and was hired
to accommodate both parents' conflicts between career and family, the family
court order at least inferred that the need for a housekeeper was more Ruth's
fault than Donald's. The maid, Doris Luden, was hired two months after
Maxfield was born.8 ' For the first four years of Maxfield's life, Doris
worked all day until either Ruth or Donald returned home from work, which
was usually around 6:00.2 She took care of Maxfield during the day,
cleaned, sewed, fed Maxfield, and cooked the family's dinner.8 3 The
description of the maid's assigned duties illustrates that her services were used
by both Donald and Ruth in an effort to raise their son in a two-career family.
In stating that the "[pilaintiff has assumed many of the household responsibilities,"' the court tends to give Donald credit for carrying out some of the
household responsibilities without equally crediting Ruth with her share.
Not withstanding the above possibilities of gender bias manifest, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina rather summarily awarded custody to the
father. The trial court had labeled Ruth a "'very determined, easily angered
career woman'" ' who is "'perceived in the business community as an
aggressive competitive individual.'"6 The supreme court noted that those
adjectives are "gender neutral and would apply equally to a male parent." 7
The court, however, did "caution the Family Courts to use the utmost

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 35.
Id.at 116.
Id. at 118.
Id.at 118.
Id. at 35.
Parris,__ S.C. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 572-73.
460 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at
460 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at
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is not susceptible
circumspection in phrasing orders to ensure that the language
88
of connotations such as those imputed by Mother here."
In summary, the supreme court in Parrisdid not find gender bias present
in the custody award, but rather affirmed an unprecedented application of the
primary caretaker presumption without regard to other factors which may have
been favorable to the mother. The court also dismissed the possibility that the
lower court's decision was effected through bias. Perhaps the court meant to
extend the application of the primary caretaker presumption to award custody
based on the mere balancing of caretaking duties of each parent without regard
to other relevant factors in the custody determination. This conclusion seems
unlikely considering it would constitute a step away from the child's best
interests. In order to avoid the dangers resulting from application of the
primary caretaker presumption to facts such as in Parris,in which both parents
share parental duties in nearly equal measure, and to ensure custody
determinations that will promote the best interests of the child, this author
suggests following West Virginia's rule -- apply the primary caretaker
presumption only when one parent has "clearly" taken the primary responsibility for caretaking duties. When both parents have shared parental responsibilities without significant, relative disparity, the South Carolina courts should
abandon the primary caretaker presumption and base decisions on other
relevant factors previously considered determinative in custody disputes.
Anna Maria Maxwell

88. Id. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 573.
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